A shielded transaction can conceal activity on a blockchain while the wallet’s network connection still reveals information. Mobile light wallets typically ask a remote server for data and use it to broadcast transactions. In Zcash, a lightwalletd server handling those requests can see the connecting IP address, the request and its timing.
As reported on November 11, 2026, Zodl, the Zcash wallet formerly called Zashi, was rolling out version 3.20.0 with Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) enabled by default. The change addresses a specific research question: can a wallet keep its server from seeing both who made a request and what they requested?
How the request is split
Zodl’s wallet encrypts a request so that only a Zodl gateway can open it, then sends it through a relay operated by Cloudflare or Fastly. The relay can see the user’s IP address but not the request contents. The gateway decrypts the request and passes it to lightwalletd; it sees the relay’s address rather than the user’s. The privacy property therefore depends on the relay and gateway not combining what they know.
The reported implementation also pads outgoing requests in roughly 4 KB increments, with transaction broadcasts padded to 16 KB or more; sensitive responses receive padding too. This is intended to make packet size less revealing. According to the account’s description of the open-source code, relay request IDs are stored in Zodl logs only as HMAC values computed with a key held in gateway memory and destroyed on restart. That design aims to make later comparison of relay and gateway logs harder. Neither measure eliminates timing or traffic-analysis risks.
At the time of the report, the code had recently launched and Zodl planned to roll the upgrade out to all users over the following days. The report did not establish that every user had already received it.

What the default does not protect against
A relay still observes when a user connects and approximately how much traffic passes through it. OHTTP also relies on separation between the relay operator and Zodl. Critics on a Zcash community forum warned that Cloudflare and Fastly, both US companies, could face legal demands, and that overstating the protection might give users a false sense of security. Zodl core contributor y4ss acknowledged the limit, describing OHTTP as a better default—not a replacement for Tor or Nym against a powerful state-level adversary. Users whose threat model includes legal pressure on cloud infrastructure can enable Zodl’s Tor option alongside OHTTP, so the relay sees a Tor exit IP rather than their own.
The network-level concern predates this release. In 2023, developer b10c documented an entity dubbed LinkingLion that monitored which Bitcoin nodes first broadcast transactions; its observed activity dated back to 2018. B10c also observed IPs from the same range connecting to Monero nodes. Those observations illustrate why first-contact metadata matters, without establishing who operated LinkingLion or what identities it determined.

Other approaches, different trade-offs
The report described several efforts to address similar leaks. Nym said in September 2026 that the Zcash wallets Zingo and Zkool had integrated its mixnet and that it was discussing cooperation with Zodl. Mixnets use multiple hops, uniform packet sizes and decoy traffic to obscure traffic matching, at the cost of latency. Nym also introduced an SDK at Devcon 8 the week before the report.
In Ethereum, the Ethereum Foundation’s Kohaku command-line tool routes traffic other than calls to a self-hosted local RPC through Tor by default. The Foundation’s June 2026 anon-rpc proposal sought a common interface for wallets to use anonymity networks; a version supporting Tor and Nym was reported live on mainnet and adopted by the Privacy Pools v2 web interface. Flashbots’ Flashnet, presented in February 2026, was described as research into anonymous transaction submission using shared batches and secret sharing. The report noted no mainnet deployment or benchmark results for it.
Bitcoin Core 31.0, released in April 2026 according to the report, added an optional private-broadcast feature using Tor or I2P and a separate connection for each transaction. Developers disclosed in June 2026 that a failed anonymous handshake could fall back to a clear-network retry, exposing the sender’s IP; the report said version 31.1 fixed the issue.
Zodl’s contribution is thus a narrower but practical default: its gateway need not receive a user’s real IP alongside a wallet request. It does not remove trust in the routing infrastructure. The Ethereum Foundation’s discussion of anon-rpc raised a related but distinct concern: reliance on centralized cloud gateways can also give providers the power to deny service. Zodl still lets users switch to community nodes in advanced settings, but neither that option nor OHTTP resolves every concentration risk.




